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The application of Effects-Based Operations in the Joint planning process requires the redefining and resolution of conceptual terms and improvements in current prediction models. This paper argues that despite some confusion to date, future work to redefine and resolve EBO conceptual terms and the promised technological improvements to decision support models will prove that effects-based thinking could provide operational planners and commanders with a valuable consequence identification tool. It further argues that System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) is beneficial in helping to identify the linkages between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, and the consequences of actions taken against those linkages. Finally, this paper draws conclusions on the validity of EBO and makes recommendations on the direction the American military should proceed with regard to EBO as an operational planning tool.
Introduction
Recent developments in the Joint arena have encouraged Joint Staffs to "shelve" the EBO planning concept. In a memorandum dated 14 August 2008, Commander, United
States Forces Joint Command (USJFCOM), Gen J.N. Mattis declared, "Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the terms and concepts related to EBO, ONA, and SoSA in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME." 3 A plethora of arguments exist over the usefulness and validity of EBO as an operational planning tool. An agreed upon, comprehensive definition of EBO and associated terminology is non-existent. Further adding to the demise of EBO is the continued failure of computer engineers and programmers to produce adequate and accurate prediction models. However, the decision to dismiss EBO may be premature. This paper argues that despite some confusion to date, future work to redefine and resolve EBO conceptual terms and the promised technological improvements to decision support models will prove that effectsbased thinking could provide operational planners and commanders with a valuable consequence identification tool. It further argues that System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) is beneficial in helping to identify the linkages between centers of gravity (COG) and critical vulnerabilities, and the consequences of actions taken against those linkages.
This paper discusses the relevance and importance of EBO, redefines concepts and terms associated with EBO while constructing a framework from which Joint planners can link objectives to centers of gravity across the full spectrum of military operations.
Additionally, it addresses the applicability of computer prediction models and their relevance in the Joint arena. Finally, this paper draws conclusions on the validity of EBO and recommends the direction the American military should proceed with regards to EBO as an operational planning tool. "Billy" Mitchell. 6 Identifying the need for an alternative to attrition warfare, early airpower theorists championed the theory that direct attacks against an enemy's population centers, infrastructure, and logistical centers would lead to capitulation.
Conception of EBO
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More recently, the modern EBO model has been shaped from the experiences of U.S.
Air Force officers who served during Vietnam. 8 Driven by civilian leadership decisions, these officers experienced firsthand the inability of American forces to achieve desirable outcomes through the aimless destruction of seemingly random targets. They recognized a need to affect an enemy's systems through the application of discriminate force on specific targets intended to achieve a desired effect. 9 Furthermore, Charles Kamps, a former U.S. The successful prosecution of parallel war requires more than compressing sequential attacks into one simultaneous attack. Parallel war exploits three dimensions-time, space, and levels of war-to achieve rapid dominance. The report further acknowledges that effects may be positive, negative, direct, indirect, intended or unintended. 21 The study suggests that if American war fighters want to simply destroy the enemy, then "dumb bombs" would be adequate. his definition "because explicitly including it enriches discussion and reveals common ground for people with different initial attitudes about EBO-people who often talk past each other because of cognitive disconnects." 26 However, the word "probability" may create more confusion amongst consumers of EBO than it clears-up.
Regardless of the definition one chooses to associate with EBO, some basic concepts remain constant. First, each definition assumes that EBO needs to be applied within a systems framework. It assumes that linkages can be drawn between critical factors and the center of gravity. Second, these definitions assume that commanders and planners can generate adequate intelligence in order to define the enemy as a system. Third, they touch 23 Ibid., 13. 24 Davis, "Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community," 7. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. upon the importance of identifying linkages and second and third order effects or consequences ( Figure 1 29 Davis, "Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community," 7.
Davis defines EBO as "Effects-based operations are operations conceived and planned in a systems framework that considers the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects, which may-with different degrees of probability-be achieved by the application of military, diplomatic, psychological, and economic instruments."
identifying only desired effects. Consequence Identification, by definition, would require staffs to identify both positive and negative results of a desired course of action (COA).
An obvious argument against Consequence Identification would be that it is impossible to foresee all likely first, second, and third order effects of an action. Milan
Vego, a Joint Military Operations Professor at the Naval War College notes:
The mix of tangible and intangible elements, combined with ever-present uncertainties, friction, and the unpredictability of the human element, makes the effects-based approach largely irrelevant.
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The idea of Consequence Identification, however, is not to identify all outcomes, but rather to establish as many plausible positive and negative consequences possible which may occur during an operation. 
SoSA and Decision Support Models
Continued improvements in technology and a shift in the nature of warfare from conventional to asymmetric are not only allowing operational commanders to employ nonmilitary assets, more precise munitions, and more effective non-kinetic fires, but also demanding operational commanders be discriminate in their application of force. EBO is a tool to help operational commanders and planners identify critical factors and link them to the COG. Additionally, EBO supporters propose that decision support models can predict outcomes with a certain degree of probability.
Joint Publication 3.0 defines the COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." 34 Proponents of EBO argue that in order to accurately identify the COG the definition must be expanded and based on SoSA. 35 A SoSA is a framework through which planners can theoretically view the battle space as a complex system comprised of individual subsystems such as economic, infrastructure and intelligence. Joint Publication 5.0 refers to this framework as the Interconnected Operational Environment (Figure 2 ). The theoretical value in developing SoSA models is that through such models, nodes and links can be identified as critical factors (critical capabilities or 33 Ibid., 69. 34 "Joint Publication 3-0," GL-7. 35 Umstead, "Effects-Based Decision Making in the War on Terror," 5. The Autonomous Paradigm, through computer software, suggests that certain tasks 36 "Joint Operation Planning," III-17. 37 Ibid., IV-11. 38 Similar to the autonomous paradigm-in that the final decision is made by the computerthis paradigm allows for the human to input information and perform minor analysis in order to set conditions for the decision. The Predictive model appears to be the most predominant paradigm. Triscari and Wales write, "the predictive paradigm derives its validity from the axiom that many events in the world are dependent upon one another." 43 One of the most relevant predictive models is the Bayesian model. A Bayesian model attempts to develop a representative image of the unpredictability of the world and eventualities through acumen and observation. These models do require humans to engage in "probability estimation"-an activity we are historically bad at, 44 most likely due to the amount of variables involved. It encourages leaders to look at an exhaustive amount of scenarios and from those models, previous experience, and judgment, develop an applicable COA. In short, it is a way to generate-not predict-plausible outcomes through war-gaming.
Opponents of EBO argue that the level of knowledge of the enemy system and the probability of desired outcomes generated from the previous mentioned decision support paradigms for EBO to be successful are inadequate. Human systems are Complex Adaptive
Systems. Interaction between components of an enemy system is dynamic and unpredictable. 47 Furthermore, affected changes may not be measurable immediately, if at all. 48 In a Joint Force Quarterly article, Milan Vego asserts, "the effects-based approach to warfare is heavily dependent on mathematical methods for predicting and measuring effects." 49 In effect, Vego and other opponents of EBO feel that it removes the "art" from Operational Art. 50 In short, computers currently do not possess the capacity to predict, to 45 Ibid., 9. 46 Ibid. 47 Davis, "Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community," 26. 48 Ibid. 49 Vego, "Effects-Based Operations: A Critique," 51. 50 Ibid. Vego writes, "This increasing trend toward using various metrics to assess essentially unquantifiable aspects of warfare only reinforces the unrealistic views of many that warfare is a science rather than both art and science."
any acceptable degree of probability, the linkages and the end result a specific action taken against these linkages will generate. Games to include economic, psychological, diplomatic, and cultural dimensions would enhance the way military leaders assess potential future operations.
Words Matter
Led by General Mattis and Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, USMC, retired, the EBO concept has received much negative and public attention. Both men raise accurate and understandable concerns. First is the confusion generated by the Ends naming convention EBO applies ( Figure 5 ) as compared to the traditional naming convention (Figure 6 ). Each feels this change in thinking has hindered our ability to determine "ends" and link them with "means". General Mattis wrote that EBO "uses confusing terminology and is difficult to understand". 57 General Van Riper is baffled at the JP 3-0 author's decision to remove intent while adding effect. 58 As a result, General Van Riper contends that the EBO approach to Joint Planning has "diverted resources" 59 while General Mattis believes it has caused "inefficiency and confusion." The simple cure for this dilemma is to return to the traditional Objectives naming convention.
This would reduce confusion and encourage commanders and staffs to focus on the objective.
It is not necessary to list desired effects to be achieved, but rather only identify the plausible consequences of proposed tasks. Combining judgment, experience, and identified consequences, commanders could then choose a COA to best support the objective.
EBO Success at the Operational Level
EBO can be applied to the full spectrum of military operations. would be required to destroy the SOCs (8:1 aircraft to target ratio). Eventually, two additional SOCs were identified and planners needed to figure out how to achieve the desired effect of disrupting the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) with the same amount of assets available. Planners finally surmised that only partial destruction was needed to achieve the desired effect in support of the operational objective of neutralizing Iraqi defenses. 64 Eventually, the decision was made to attack the SOCs with a 2:1 aircraft to target ratio. Wording of the OPLAN also suggests planners were focused on effects rather than destruction from the outset. 65 Planners used terms like disruption, isolation and loss of confidence to describe desired outcomes. 66 Operations were planned to be conducted both jointly and with coalition partners as described below:
…special operation forces were to destroy intercept operations centers on the Iraq-Saudi border, resistance forces were to disrupt key communication sites in Kuwait and Iraq, while naval forces were to initiate sea control and countermine operations in the Gulf. And finally, under the cover of the air campaign, ground forces were to move into attack positions for the final phase of Desert Storm…
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For example, the 25 percent effectiveness BDA ascribed to a Desert Storm sortie, because bombing had destroyed only 25 percent of the intelligence headquarters building, ignored the effect subsequently created by personnel evacuation, which fully achieved the "functional kill" that planners intended. Likewise, this error was repeated in Allied Force when analysts appraised a target as "not destroyed" because there were still one and a half walls standing after the strike.
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The problems faced by planners during Desert Storm with regard to EBO still remain a major concern for critics of EBO. This single operation was successful at developing adequate intelligence, identifying the necessary elements to be employed, and synchronizing them to achieve a desired effect in support of the operational objective.
Conclusion
To be candid, EBO is confusing because no single definition exists. Ask a hundred different people to define it and a hundred definitions will be given. EBO, as the Joint Publication authors describe it, encourages planning staffs to focus on the effects rather than the objective. EBO is a method by which commanders and planners should try to identify consequences through constant analysis.
The benefit of EBO is not necessarily in having the ability to predict outcomes or generate identical computer models of an enemy's complex adaptive system. The benefit of EBO lies in its ability to convince planners and commanders to think creatively. Operational leaders need to be able to consciously ask "What If?" Joint Staff members need to be able to manage consequence; positive and negative. EBO planning concepts require staffs to constantly analyze and reassess the operation. Therefore, effects-based thinking is useful in identifying plausible outcomes. These plausible outcomes can be used to generate branches 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., 30. or sequels for an operation. They may identify decisive points or decision points by encouraging planners to take a unique look at an old situation.
Although SoSA is not a required component to conduct planning, it could prove valuable. It is extremely complex and time consuming but it does not require computing power to a degree far beyond that which currently exists. As a targeting method for closed systems (such as an Integrated Air Defense System) these models have been successful at helping to identify key nodes of infrastructure and defense systems. These closed systems are often related directly to a center of gravity and if attacked, can have great effect on weakening it. Relying on them to develop an accurate prediction of cause and effect
relationships may yet be too unreliable to consider. However, certain models may identify causal linkages between a center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that would have otherwise been overlooked.
Computer-based cultural or psychological prediction models need much improvement before they can be integrated into the planning process. However, as Dr. Waghelstein and Dr. Chisholm suggest, a systems framework based on historical analysis would be useful in understanding an insurgency and developing a COA.
Effects-based thinking and planning is about consequence identification. EffectsBased planning concepts could provide operational planners and commanders with a valuable planning apparatus.
Recommendations
There is no substitute for experience or judgment. However, commanders and planners should not disregard EBO in its entirety simply because some aspects-near perfect intelligence and reliable decision support models-have not been adequately developed.
Individual concepts and ideas relating to EBO should be maintained by the USFJCOM. 
